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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 910241
Priority No. 2

TERI LIN GODDARD,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann.
§78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1992), which grants original appellate jurisdiction to the Utah Supreme Court over appeals in criminal cases
from the district court "involving a conviction of a first degree
or capital felony . . . ."

Defendant, Teri Lin Goddard, was con-

victed of second degree murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1990).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The following issues are presented in this brief for
review:
1.

Was the evidence sufficient to sustain a guilty ver-

dict of second degree murder?
2.

Did the trial court err in failing to grant

-i-

defendant's motion to arrest the judgment or motion to dismiss in
light of the trial court's dismissal of the depraved indifference
variation of second degree murder?
3.

Did the trial court commit error by refusing to

require separate verdicts for the two separate variations of second degree murder?
4.

Did the trial court err in refusing to grant the

defendant's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered,
exculpatory evidence unavailable at trial?
5.

Was defendant's trial counsel ineffective because:
(a)

She failed to investigate circumstances sur-

rounding the State's theory of the case with respect to
the blood spatter evidence?
(b)

She failed to challenge the medical examiner's

qualifications to testify regarding blood spatter
evidence?
(c)

She failed to object to the prosecutor's

repeated questions on cross-examination of the defendant
which asked the defendant why other witnesses would lie?
Insufficiency of the evidence claims require an appellate
court to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict.

State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989).

If the

evidence is so inconclusive that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, the appellate
court must reverse the conviction.

_o_

State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 7 32,

738 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure permits a
trial court to arrest judgment if "the facts proved or admitted do
not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill,
or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment."

The

appellate court may determine that judgment should have been
arrested if the verdict was based on evidence "'so inherently
improbable that no reasonable mind could believe it.1"

State v.

Workman, 806 P.2d 1198, 1203 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting State
v, Myers, 606 P.2d 250, 252-53 (Utah 1980)).
Appellate review of the trial court's refusal to give
certain jury instructions involves a question of law.

Therefore,

the trial court's decision is accorded no deference and the decision is reviewed by the appellate court for correctness.

Ramon

v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d
1201, 1203 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
A motion for new trial is governed by the standards set
forth in Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; a court
may grant a new trial in the interest of justice if "there is any
error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse affect upon
the rights of a party."

The trial court's decision to grant or

deny a motion for a new trial is a matter of discretion and will
not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.

State v.

Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985).
Finally, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim pre-

-3-

sents a mixed question of law and fact.

State v. Templin, 805

P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Where no claim of ineffectiveness has been

presented to the trial court, an appellate court may review the
record to determine on appeal whether counsel's performance constituted ineffective assistance as a matter of law.

Government

of the Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 133-34 (3d Cir. 1984);
Johnson, 823 P.2d at 487.
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Any statutes, rules or constitutional provisions relevant
to the disposition of this appeal are set forth in the text or
addenda of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Teri Lin Goddard, was charged with one count
of criminal homicide, murder in the second degree, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1990).

(R. 7-9)

The State initially alleged that Ms. Goddard killed her live-in
boyfriend, Derek Hall either (a) intentionally or knowingly and/or
intending to cause serious bodily injury, she committed an act
clearly dangerous to life that resulted in his death and/or (c)
acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference
to his life she engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of
death and thereby caused his death. (R. 7) (Addendum A)

At the

end of the State's case the defendant moved to dismiss the charge

-4-

alleging that the evidence had not shown either an intentional or
knowing homicide or an intent to inflict bodily injury or action
constituting depraved indifference to human life.

(R. 177 at

326.) 1 The court denied the motion to dismiss with respect to the
first two variations of second degree homicide but took the motion
to dismiss with respect to the third variation (i.e., depraved
indifference) under advisement.

(R. 177 at 337)

Ultimately, the

trial court dismissed the depraved indifference variation.

(R.

178 at 409) At the close of all evidence, the defendant moved for
a directed verdict arguing that the evidence did not support an
intentional or knowing homicide or a homicide committed with the
intent to inflict serious bodily injury.
motion was denied by the trial court.

(R. 178 at 546)

(R. 178 at 546)

The

At the

conclusion of its deliberations, the jury convicted Ms. Goddard as
charged.

(R. 110, R. 178 at 553)
Six days after the defendant's conviction, a hearing took

place on the defendant's motion to arrest judgment.

The defendant

argued that the evidence demonstrating that the homicide was
either an intentional or knowing act or that it was done with the
intent to inflict serious bodily injury on the victim was incredible and thus, insufficient.

(R. 120, R. 180 at 5) (Addendum B)

The trial court denied the defendant's motion to arrest judgment.
(R. 180 at 8).

1

All references are to record citations. The first page of each
transcript volume is stamped with a record citation. Transcripts
which are numbered or dated have the following record citations:
T.I (10/9/90) . . . R.176
-5-

At the sentencing hearing the defendant moved to continue
the proceeding arguing that new evidence was just becoming available which would affect the trial court's decision on its motion to
arrest judgment or would influence the trial court's sentencing
decision.

(R. 179 at 1)

The motion was denied and the defendant

was subsequently sentenced to a term of incarceration in the Utah
State Prison of from five years to life and assessed fines and
fees totalling $6,750.00.

(R. 127)

The defendant subsequently moved for a new trial.
124-25) (Addendum C)

(R.

At the hearing on the motion for a new

trial, the defendant argued that newly discovered evidence, specifically blood spatter evidence from a blood spatter expert,
Judith Bunker, called into question physical evidence presented by
the State and conclusions drawn by the State's expert, Dr. Sharon
Schnittker.

(R. 181 at 3-4)

The defendant argued that Dr.

Schnittker's trial testimony was a surprise to the defense.
181 at 5)

(R.

The State argued that the evidence could in fact have

been discovered by the defendant before trial.

(R. 181 at 11)

The trial court, after hearing arguments on both sides and evaluating the evidence, denied the defendant's motion for a new trial.

T.II (10/10/90) . . . R. 177
T.III (10/11/92) . . . R. 178
Transcript of 10/17/90 . . . R.
Transcript of 12/07/90 . . . R.
Transcript of 04/29/91 . . . R.
Transcript of 11/19/91 . . . R.
-6-

180
179
181
182

(R. 181 at 17) From the conviction and judgment imposed upon her,
defendant appeals.
FACTS
On June 1, 1990, the defendant, Teri Lin Goddard, and her
seven-year-old

son lived at 1235 LaFayette Drive in Salt Lake.

Ms. Goddard's boyfriend, Derek Hall, also lived at that address.
Mr. Hall was on parole and was in violation of his parole
agreement.

(R. 177 at 362)

In fact, Mr. Hall was aware that a

warrant had been issued for his arrest for the parole violation.
(R. 177 at 363, 402)
Throughout the day of June 1, 1990, Ms. Goddard and Mr.
Hall were at their home drinking with friends.

(R. 177 at 378-81)

In the early evening hours, Mr. Hall went to another person's
house on the block where he continued drinking; he was followed
there by Ms. Goddard.

(R. 177 at 382-85).

From there, Mr. Hall

went to the house of Frank Gutierrez, another neighbor who was in
the vicinity, and there Mr. Hall continued drinking.
110)

(R. 176 at

Also at the Gutierrez residence were Jay Jackson and at

least two other women who were acquaintances of Mr. Gutierrez.
(R. 176 at 109, 118)

Sometime before 10:00 o'clock in the

evening, Ms. Goddard arrived at Mr. Gutierrez's residence.

While

her original intention was to retrieve Mr. Hall, she soon joined
in the party.

(R. 178 at 438)

Subsequently, Ms. Goddard engaged in an argument with at

-7-

least one of the two women at the party.

(R. 176 at 118)

To oth-

ers at the party, this argument seemed to be degenerating to the
point that violence would soon ensue.

(R. 176 at 125, 152)

Gutierrez stated that the fighting amongst the women was so loud
that he asked the women to leave his house.

(R. 176 at 125) Mr.

Hall had previously left the residence and had returned to his
home.

Ms. Goddard was angry with the other women when she left

Mr. Gutierrez's house.

(R. 176 at 118) In fact, Ms.

Goddard tes-

tified that one of the women had physically threatened her and she
was in fear for her own safety when she left Mr.
house.

Gutierrez's

(R. 177 at 390)
After leaving Gutierrez's house, Ms. Goddard went to her

own home.

There she retrieved a knife from a drawer in the

kitchen because of her fear of the other women and her desire to
protect herself from an anticipated attack.

(R. 177 at 392) Ms.

Goddard then walked into the living room where she found Mr. Hall.
When she informed Mr. Hall of the reason for her fear and why she
had the knife, Ms. Goddard stated that Mr. Hall yelled at her.
(R. 177 at 396) Mr. Hall was aware of the warrant which had been
issued for his arrest and wanted to avoid any situation which
might bring the police and thus precipitate his arrest.

(R. 177

at 402)
Ms. Goddard, the only witness to subsequent events, testified that Mr. Hall continued to yell at her.

(R. 177 at 396)

Ms. Goddard stated that Mr. Hall pushed her a number of times and

-ft-

then grabbed her and pushed her into a rocking chair in the living
room.

(R. 177 at 397-98)

Ms. Goddard testified that Mr. Hall

then kneeled between her legs while she was in a prone position in
the rocker.

(R. 177 at 399) Ms. Goddard was still holding the

knife which she had obtained to defend herself from the women who
had engaged in the argument with her earlier.
Ms.

Goddard testified that Mr. Hall grabbed both of her hands and

then leaned forward.
Mr.

(R. 177 at 399)

Hall's chest.

As he leaned forward, the knife penetrated
(R. 177 at 399)

Ms. Goddard stated that Mr.

Hall looked at her and then stated, "What did you do, stab me in
the heart?"

(R. 177 at 399)

Goddard and fell over.

Mr. Hall then pushed off from Ms.

(R. 177 at 400)

Ms. Goddard testified

that at first she believed Mr. Hall was playing some sort of practical joke.

(R. 177 at 401)

She then saw blood on Mr. Hall's

chest and realized that Mr. Hall had been stabbed.

(R. 177 at

401) .
Once she realized what had happened, Ms. Goddard became
hysterical and ran throughout the neighborhood yelling for her
neighbors to call the police and paramedics.

(R. 177 at 402) The

officers who subsequently arrived stated that Ms. Goddard was
hysterical and that she made various statements questioning
whether or not she had killed Mr. Hall and indicating that it was
not her intention to harm him.

(R. 177 at 177, 223, 231, 245)

Medical testimony indicated that the knife had penetrated
cartilage between the ribs, pierced the upper lobe of the right
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lung, the pericardial sac, a portion of the heart, and the front
portion of the aorta,

(R.

177 at 262)

Subsequent bleeding into

the pericardial sac caused compression of the heart which was the
cause of Mr. Hall's death.

(R. 177 at 263)

The medical examiner

also testified that Mr. Hall had a small cut on his left palm.
The medical examiner speculated that the wound might be a defensive wound although the wound was so small that no bleeding
resulted from it.

(R. 177 at 267-268, 282)

The prosecution originally theorized that Mr.

Hall and

Ms. Goddard were both standing when Ms. Goddard stabbed Mr. Hall.
(R. 177 at 369)

However, blood stains on the arm of the chair in

which Ms. Hall stated she was positioned were inconsistent with
this theory of the case.

(R. 177 at 371)

In rebuttal, the prose-

cution relied on the medical examiner, Dr. Sharon Schnittker, to
rebut the defendant's version of the case.

Dr. Schnittker testi-

fied that the defendant's version was "extremely unlikely" because
of the absence of blood on her shirt which Dr. Schnittker claimed
would have been present had Mr. Hall been in the position which
Ms. Goddard claimed.

(R. 178 at 485-87)

The jury subsequently

convicted Ms. Goddard as charged.
After trial, Ms. Goddard's attorney filed a motion to
arrest judgment arguing that Dr. Schnittker's refusal to change
her opinion in the face of consistent hypothetical evidence which
was presented to her during the trial left the jury with the erroneous impression that only Dr. Schnittkerfs view of the case was

-i n -

consistent with the facts as presented by the prosecution.
180 at 3-4)

(R.

The defense argued that Dr. Schnittker relied on her

experience to ignore substantial evidence by the defense which
indicated Ms. Goddard's innocence.

(R. 180 at 4)

denied the defendant's motion to arrest judgment.

The trial court
(R. 180 at 8)

At the sentencing proceeding, the defendant moved to stay
the proceeding, arguing that new evidence was being developed
which would exonerate Ms. Goddard.

(R. 179 at 1) That motion was

ultimately denied and Ms. Goddard was sentenced.

(R. 179 at 9)

Subsequently, Ms. Goddard filed a motion for a new trial
claiming that newly discovered evidence was exculpatory and should
provide the basis for a new trial.

The evidence in question was

an affidavit from Judith Bunker, a nationally recognized blood
spatter expert.

Ms. Bunker's affidavit stated that blood spatter

evidence at the scene and on the victim were entirely consistent
with Ms. Goddard's version of the events.

(R. 152-55)

The

defense argued that such new evidence should provide the court
with the basis for ordering a new trial because of the thorough
review of the evidence conducted by Ms. Bunker and the fact that
the physical evidence in the case had not been reviewed by Dr.
Schnittker before her testimony.

(R. 181 at 4)

Ultimately, the

trial court denied Ms. Goddard1s motion for a new trial.
at 17)

-11-

(R. 181

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Ms. Goddard first contends that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of second degree murder.
Specifically, Ms. Goddard asserts that even stretched to its limits the evidence does not support the inference that she had the
requisite mental state to commit the offense.
Ms. Goddard next asserts that the trial court should have
granted either her motion to dismiss, for a directed verdict or to
arrest judgment because of lack of evidence of intent and because
of the trial court's dismissal of the depraved indifference variant of second degree murder.

According to prior decisions of this

Court if evidence of depraved indifference was absent then evidence of the other two variants of second degree murder was also
absent.
Ms. Goddard next alleges that the trial court committed
reversible error when it refused to require the jury to be unanimous on the variation of second degree murder which it found.
Because of the unusual circumstances of this case, previous case
law on this issue is inapplicable.
Ms. Goddard contends that new evidence discovered after
trial justified granting her a new trial.

The evidence from a

blood spatter expert refuted testimony by the medical examiner and
validated Ms. Goddard!s version of the events.
Finally, Ms. Goddard asserts that she was deprived of her
right to effective assistance of counsel.

-12-

Her trial counsel

failed to investigate blood spatter evidence, failed to object to
the medical examiner testifying as an expert in blood spatter
interpretation, and failed to object to the prosecutor's questions
to the defendant about other witness1 motives to lie.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A
VERDICT OF GUILTY ON THE CHARGE OF SECOND
DEGREE MURDER.
The State initially charged Ms. Goddard with murder in
the second degree, alleging that Ms. Goddard: (a) intentionally or
knowingly caused the death of Derek Hall, and/or (b) intending to
cause serious bodily injury to Derek Hall committed an act clearly
dangerous to human life that caused his death, and/or (c) acting
under circumstances evidencing depraved indifference to human life
engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death and thereby
caused Derek Hall's death.

(R. 7) At the conclusion of the

State's case, Ms. Goddard moved to dismiss the charge alleging
that the evidence had not shown either an intentional or knowing
homicide or that she acted with an intent to inflict serious bodily injury or that her actions evidenced depraved indifference to
human life.

(R. 177 at 326)

The court denied the motion to dis-

miss based on the first two variations of second degree homicide
but took the motion to dismiss with respect to depraved indifference under advisement.

(R. 177 at 3 37) Ultimately, the trial

- i -*-

court dismissed the depraved indifference variation.

(R. 178 at

409) At the close of all evidence, Ms. Goddard moved for a
directed verdict arguing that the evidence did not support an
intentional or knowing homicide or homicide committed with the
intent to inflict serious bodily injury as required by the
statute.
court.

(R. 178 at 546)

The motion was denied by the trial

(R. 178 at 546) After trial, the trial court denied

defendant's motion to arrest judgment.

(R. 180 at 8)

In reviewing an insufficiency claim, the appellate court
must "review the evidence, along with the reasonable inferences
from it, in a light most favorable to the verdict."
Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989).

State v.

If "the evidence and its

inferences are so 'inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted,1" then
the appellate court must reverse the conviction.

State v. Moore,

802 P2d 732, 738 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting State v. Petree,
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)).

"[S]o long as some evidence and

reasonable inferences support the jury findings, [the appellate
court] will not disturb them."

Moore, 802 P.2d at 738. While

noting the deference due evidence which supports a jury's verdict,
this Court stated in Petree that:
The fabric of evidence against the defendant must
cover the gap between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In fulfillment of
its duty to review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in
the light most favorable to the verdict, the
reviewing court will stretch the evidentiary

fabric as far as it will go. But this does not
mean that the court can take a speculative leap
across a remaining gap in order to sustain a
verdict. The evidence, stretched to its utmost
limits, must be sufficient to prove the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
659 P.2d at 445.

In this case, there is no question that Teri

Goddard held the knife which killed Derek Hall.

However, a sig-

nificant gap in the evidence concerning the required mens rea is
present and only a speculative leap across the gap in the
stretched evidence provides the basis for a conviction of Ms.
Goddard.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict,
the evidence against Ms. Goddard which supports the mens rea
required to establish second degree homicide is as follows:
Christine Grogan, who lived in the neighborhood, testified that on
the night of June 1, 1990, at approximately 7:00 p.m. she observed
Ms. Goddard screaming at Frank Gutierrez's truck as it went around
the corner.

Ms. Grogan testified that Ms. Goddard screamed,

"Don't come back here or I'll kill you.
from me."

(R. 176 at 90)

You stay the hell away

However, Ms. Grogan saw only Frank

Gutierrez in the truck and specifically testified, "I did not know
that Derek was in the truck that night."

(R. 176 at 90, 95)

Sometime later, Ms. Grogan was informed by Frank Gutierrez that
Derek was in the truck.

(R. 176 at 95)

Ms. Grogan specifically

said that the incident was not unusual to her and that, at the
time, she "didn't think anything of it."

-15-

(R. 176 at 90)

Frank Gutierrez, another neighbor, testified that the
victim, Derek Hall, was at his house for a large portion of the
evening of June 1.

Mr. Gutierrez testified that sometime during

the course of the evening he and Mr. Hall drove in Mr. Gutierrez's
truck to purchase gas and beer.

(R. 176 at 111)

Mr. Gutierrez

testified that he neither heard nor saw Ms. Goddard during the
trip.

(R. 176 at 111, 112) Among other things, Mr. Gutierrez

testified that sometime after Ms. Goddard joined the party during
the evening, she put his hands on her breasts in an effort to get
Mr. Hall angry.

(R. 176 at 116)

However, the speculation as to

Ms. Goddardfs motives in allegedly performing this action was
stricken.

(R. 176 at 116)

During cross-examination, Mr.

Gutierrez testified that he perceived Ms. Goddardfs actions as a
joke.

(R. 176 at 130) Finally, Mr. Gutierrez testified that when

Mr. Hall left, Mr. Hall seemed to be feeling good and "he seemed
to be happy."

(R. 176 at 113)

Mr. Gutierrez testified that while

Ms. Goddard was "a little angry" when she left the party, after
Mr. Hall, her departure occurred immediately following what others
characterized as a heated argument between Ms. Goddard and two
other women.

(R. 176 at 118, 152)

Another neighbor, Beth Steed, testified that in the early
morning hours of June 2, 1990, she was awakened by loud voices
coming from the Goddard home.

(R. 176 at 155-56)

While Ms. Steed

was able to identify both a male and a female voice, she was unable to discern what was being said.

(R. 176 at 156)

Finally, a crucial portion of the State's case against
Ms. Goddard regarding her intent on the evening in question concerned the State's theory of how the homicide occurred. Ms.
Goddard asserted that Mr. Hall's death was an accident.

(R. 177

at 404) The testimony of Dr. Sharon Schnittker, the Associate
State Medical Examiner, was critical to the State's contention
that Mr. Hall's death was not accidental and had the effect of
demonstrating Ms. Goddard's intent to kill Mr. Hall or to inflict
serious bodily injury.

Dr. Schnittker testified that Mr. Hall had

a single, small stab wound to the chest. (R. 177 at 261)

The

wound penetrated the cartilage between the ribs, the upper lobe of
the right lung, pierced the pericardial sac, then entered the
heart and the large aorta.

(R. 177 at 262)

Dr. Schnittker testi-

fied that in her opinion the fatal wound was inflicted by a thrust
of the knife rather than Mr. Hall's falling on the knife.
at 275)

(R. 177

Dr. Schnittker also testified that Mr. Hall suffered what

she speculated could have been a "defensive wound" on the left
palm.

The wound did not cause any bleeding and was a cut so

insignificant that the photograph of the cut required placement of
a paper arrow to show the position of the cut.

(R. 177 at 264-78,

282)
Ms. Goddard testified that she ran from Frank Gutierrez's
house after engaging in a heated argument with two other women
concerning one of the other women's desires to obtain cocaine.
(R. 177 at 366-90)

Ms. Goddard testified that she was very
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frightened that the women would pursue her to her home.
at 391)

(R. 177

Ms. Goddard testified that she obtained the knife from

her kitchen when she entered her house to protect herself from the
women at Mr. Gutierrez's house and not from Derek Hall.

(R. 177

at 392) When she informed Mr. Hall of why she had the knife, he
became concerned that the confrontation and fight would move to
his residence.

Ms. Goddard testified that Mr. Hall knew of a war-

rant for his arrest and was afraid that any incident which brought
the police to his house would result in his arrest.

(R. 177 at

402) Therefore, Mr. Hall started yelling at Ms. Goddard and pushing her.

Ms. Goddard testified that Mr. Hall grabbed her and

pushed her into the rocking chair which was in the living room.
(R. 177 at 397-98)
in the chair.

Ms. Goddard landed in a nearly prone position

(R. 177 at 398)

Ms. Goddard was holding the knife

between her thumb and forefinger with the blade extending outward.
(R. 177 at 398)

Mr. Hall was in a kneeling position between Ms.

Goddard's legs and was holding both of her arms above the elbow.
(R. 177 at 399)

Ms. Goddard testified that Mr. Hall then grabbed

the hand which was holding the knife with his hand.
399)

(R. 177 at

Ms. Goddard testified:
[Mr. Hall] leaned down on top of me, like he
leaned on me, and then I remember, you know, I
remember him looking at me and I was looking at
him and then I remember him saying, what did you
do, stab me in the heart. And then I remember
looking down. He was still kind of lying on me.
And I remember thinking oh my God, I think, oh my
God, then I remember him, . . . remember him
dropping his arm down there and then he leaned,
he fell to the side of the chair, and he dropped
his hand back this way down here and then he came
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back. And then I remember him going up off the
top of me. And I don!t remember him falling, him
standing, or what happened at that time.
(R. 177 at 399-400)

Ms. Goddard testified that she just remem-

bered pushing Mr. Hall off of her and his falling.

(R. 177 at

400)
In contravention of Ms. Goddardfs version of the events,
Dr. Schnittker testified that, in her opinion,
fall forward "for any period of time."

Mr. Hall did not

(R. 177 at 274) Dr.

Schnittker also testified that, in her opinion, the force required
to inflict the wound was more of a "directed force" and more than
would be obtained by Mr. Hall's falling on the knife.

(R. 177 at

274-75) However, Dr. Schnittker also testified that holding a person's arms could fix the knife sufficiently to cause the wound if
the victim fell on the knife.

(R. 177 at 279-80)

Dr. Schnittker

stated that the wound was in a horizontal plane, i.e. it was not
inflicted with either an upward or downward stabbing motion.
177 at 297)

(R.

Dr. Schnittker assumed that Mr. Hall was standing

when the fatal wound was inflicted.

(R. 177 at 311-12) However,

despite the fact that Mr. Hall's body was found in a backward
kneeling position with his feet and lower legs underneath the
upper portion of his legs, Dr. Schnittker found no bruises on Mr.
Hall's knees.

(R. 177 at 309)

After Ms. Goddard's testimony, Dr. Schnittker testified
in rebuttal.

She testified that Ms. Goddard's version was

"extremely unlikely" because of the lack of blood on the front of
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Ms. Goddard1s shirt.

Dr. Schnittker stated that immediately fol-

lowing infliction of the wound "some drops of blood" would have
fallen on the shirt.

(R. 178 at 485)

Finally, Dr. Schnittker

testified:
Q. (by the prosecutor): How likely is it, in your
best judgment, that the — as to the likelihood
of the wound being inflicted into the body of
Derek Hall in the manner described [by Teri
Goddard]?
A.: Well, in my opinion it is extremely unlikely
and there's certain, three inconsistencies, the
most major of which is the lack of blood on
either his left hand or her pink sweat shirt.
Second would be that I see no plausible reason why, with the stabilization of his body that
Mr. Derek Hall would have [fallen forward].
(R. 178 at 487)

Dr. Schnittker also testified that other incon-

sistencies convinced her that the version of events portrayed by
Ms. Goddard could not have occurred.

(R. 178 at 487-88)

From

this evidence, the jury concluded that Ms. Goddard had the requisite intent to kill or to inflict serious bodily injury upon Mr.
Hall sufficient to convict her of second degree homicide.
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1990) defines second degree
murder as follows:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the
second degree if the actor:
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the death
of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to
another, he commits an act clearly dangerous to
human life that causes the death of another;
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a
depraved indifference to human life, he engages
in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to
another and thereby causes the death of another;
or
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(d) while in the commission, attempted
commission, or immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of [several enumerated offenses] causes the death of another person
other than a party as defined in §76-2-202.
(2) Murder in the second degree is a felony of
the first degree.
In this case subsections (a), (b), and (c) were originally charged
by the prosecution.

During the course of the trial, the trial

court granted the defense motion to drop the depraved indifference
variation, subsection (c). Therefore, to find the defendant
guilty, the jury had to find culpable mental states of either (a)
an intent to kill or (b) an intent to inflict serious bodily
injury.
In State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988), this
Court explained the degree of mental culpability required for a
finding of guilt on a second degree murder charge.

The Court

stated:
[The terms used to identify the mental state
in the statute] are comparable to the old malice
aforethought, but are much more precise and less
confusing. The statute treats these forms of
homicide as having similar culpability. Second
degree murder is based on a very high degree of
moral culpability. That culpability arises
either from an actual intent to kill or from a
mental state that is essentially equivalent
thereto — such as intending grievous bodily
injury and knowingly creating a very high risk of
death. The risk of death in the latter two
instances must be so great as to evidence such an
indifference to life as to be tantamount to that
evidenced by an intent to kill. In contrast, the
felony-murder provision of the second degree murder statute is something of an exception to the
above principle, as it does not require an intent
to kill or any similar mental state.
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769 P.2d at 259.

In short, either of the mental states required

to convict Ms. Goddard must have been the equivalent of an intent
to kill.

See also State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985).
The evidence in this case does not support an inference

by the jury of an intent to kill.

While some evidence indicates

that Ms. Goddard may have been upset with Mr. Hall earlier in the
evening, the evidence qualitatively deficient.

For example,

Christine Grogan, who testified that she heard Ms. Goddard yell at
Frank Gutierrez's pickup, also testified that she did not see Mr.
Hall in the pickup.

Furthermore, Ms. Grogan stated that she

thought nothing of Ms. Goddard1s screaming at the Gutierrez truck.
Mr. Gutierrez testified that he neither saw nor heard Ms. Goddard
on his trip to the store with Mr. Hall.

Later in the evening, at

the Gutierrez house, Frank Gutierrez testified that Ms. Goddard
placed his hands on her breasts, that he was sure Mr. Hall saw the
action, but that he considered the action to be nothing more than
a joke.

Mr. Gutierrez testified that when Mr. Hall left the

party, he left the party in a happy emotional state.

Those who

witnessed the events at the party testified that while Ms.
Goddard left the party upset and angry, her anger was directed not
at Mr. Hall but at the women with whom she had just engaged in a
verbal confrontation.

Ms. Goddard herself testified that she was

frightened for her own safety when she went to her house.

She

testified that while Mr. Hall became upset with her because of his
fear that the police would arrive and arrest him, she intended no
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harm to Mr. Hall.
The primary inference of intent is found in the testimony
of Dr. Sharon Schnittker, the medical examiner.

From the nature

of the wound, Schnittker concluded that the wound must have
resulted from a thrusting motion.

However, even Schnittker con-

ceded that she had "no idea of the exact amount of force" used to
administer the wound.

(R. 137 at 289)

Schnittkerfs other damag-

ing testimony concerned the lack of blood spatter patterns which
she believed would have been present had the incident occurred as
Ms. Goddard described.

However, given Schnittkerfs equivocation

on the first point and speculation on the second, the evidence was
simply insufficient to conclude that Ms. Goddard had the requisite
intent to kill which is required to convict of second degree
murder.
Those who saw Ms. Goddard immediately following the incident all described her as hysterical and repentant.

For example,

Ms. Louise Miyatake, a neighbor, testified that Ms. Goddard was
very upset and hysterical and that she approached the police as
soon as she saw police cars arrive in the neighborhood.
at 164-68)

(R. 176

Robert Hawke, one of the first Salt Lake City police

officers on the scene, testified that Ms. Goddard was hysterical
when he arrived and that she asked "Did I kill him?
to."

(R. 177 at 177)

I didn't mean

Robert Linton, another Salt Lake City

police officer, testified that Ms. Goddard was hysterical, that
she waived him down while he was still in the car and pleaded with
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him to "go help [Mr. Hall]."

(R. 177 at 223)

Several other Salt

Lake City officers testified that Ms. Goddard was hysterical when
they arrived.

(R. 177 at 231, 237, 245, 324)

Ms. Goddard's

actions immediately following the stabbing of Mr. Hall were
totally inconsistent with an intent to kill that the State hypothesized she possessed mere minutes before.
Nothing in the evidence provides a sufficient basis for
the inference of an intent to kill which is prerequisite for
conviction of second degree murder.

While a jury is free to infer

the requisite mental state to convict a defendant of a crime, the
jury may not speculate on what the defendant's mental state in
fact was.

This conviction was based on nothing more than

speculation and must be reversed.
POINT II
GIVEN THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF THE
DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE VARIATION, THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS,
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AND TO ARREST JUDGMENT.
During trial the defense made motions to dismiss and for
a directed verdict based on the lack of the requisite mental
state.

(R. 177 at 326-37, R. 178 at 409, 546)

The trial court

granted the defense motion to preclude the depraved indifference
variation of second degree murder.

(R. 178 at 409)

While not

specifically articulating the reasons for the decision, the trial
court must have concluded that the requisite mental state to support the depraved indifference variant was lacking.
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After trial,

the defense moved to arrest judgment arguing that the evidence of
intent, particularly that provided by Dr. Schnittker, was not
credible and therefore, not sufficient to sustain a guilty
verdict,2

(R. 120, R. 180 at 1-8)

Based on the trial court's

dismissal of the depraved indifference variant and the case law
from this Court, one of the motions should have been granted.
In State v. Sandiford, 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988), the
Court held that the first three variants of second degree murder
were essentially identical.

769 P.2d 259.

Previously, in State

v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162 (Utah 1987), the Court held that a jury
need not be unanimous in deciding which of the first three variants of second degree murder is applicable in any particular case
because the variants are virtually equivalent.

In a concurring

opinion, Justice Stewart indicated his concern that the lead opinion not be applied to crimes other than second degree murder.
Justice Stewart concluded that "because their mental states are so
highly similar, from the point of view of mental functioning and
culpability, I think the jury was for essential constitutional
purposes unanimous on the mens rea element." 733 P.2d at 170.
After an extensive analysis of the Utah provision and comparison
with the Model Penal Code, Justice Stewart stated that he concurred with the lead opinion's result because:
Despite . . . departure from the Model Penal
Code, it is clear from Russell, 106 Utah 116,
145 P.2d 1003, and the MPC Commentary that all

2

Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure defines
when a trial court may arrest judgment in a criminal case:
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the mental states in §76-5-203(1)(a), (b), (c)
are essentially forms of common law malice
aforethought. Each is at least "an intention or
design previously formed to do an act or admit to
an act, knowing that the reasonable and natural
consequences thereof would be likely to cause
death or great bodily injury." Russell, 106 Utah
at 126, 145 P.2d at 1007.
Not only is each mental state in the Utah
statute a form of common law malice aforethought
but each one also amounts to a varied form of
depraved indifference murder. Certainly, intentionally causing death demonstrates depraved
indifference to the value of the life taken
Therefore, a juror who finds that a defendant
intentionally or knowingly committed a homicide
must necessarily find depraved indifference
because a defendant who intends to kill is aware
that his conduct creates a grave risk of death.
A person who intends to cause serious bodily
injury while doing an act "clearly dangerous" to

At any time prior to the imposition of sentence,
the court, upon its own initiative may, or upon
motion of the defendant shall, arrest judgment if
the facts proved or admitted do not constitute a
public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill,
or there is other good cause for the arrest of
judgment. Upon arresting judgment the court may,
unless it be judgment of acquittal of the offense
charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, order
a commitment until the defendant is charged anew
or retried, or may enter any other order that may
be just and proper under the circumstances.
In State v. Myers, 606 P.2d 250, 251 (Utah 1980), this Court
stated that a trial judge may intrude upon a jury's verdict and
substitute his judgment therefor "if he can rule as a matter of
law." In State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198, 1202 (Utah Ct. App.
1991), the court of appeals, after contrasting the Utah provision
with its federal counterpart, stated that a judgment may be
arrested "based on an insufficiency of the evidence or facts as
proved in trial or as admitted by the parties." Therefore, a
judgment may be arrested by a trial court based on either the
facts or the law. In this case the trial court should have
arrested judgment based on the facts and law.
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human life, also acts with a depraved indifference to the value of human life. Serious bodily
injury is defined as "bodily injury that creates
or causes serious prominent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any
bodily member or organ or creates a substantial
risk of death." §76-1-601(9). A person whose
"conscious objective or desire" is to cause that
type of injury while committing an act clearly
dangerous to human life, §76-2-103(1), also demonstrates depraved indifference. The objective
depraved indifference judgment is made out when
the nature of injury the defendant intends to
cause is "serious," as opposed to "slight." . . .
It follows that regardless of which mental
state individual jurors relied upon in reaching
this verdict, all agreed that the defendant knowingly engaged in conduct that created a grave
risk of death of the victim and that he acted
under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life.
7 33 P.2d at 17 3-74.

Justice Stewartfs opinion in Russell formed

the basis for the decision in Standiford and is reflected in the
lengthy discussion of depraved indifference contained in
Standiford.
According to this analysis, the depraved indifference
variation of second degree murder is necessarily subsumed in variations a and b of second degree murder.

Even if variations a and

b are absent, the depraved indifference variation may still be
present.

This is so because the three variations form a continuum

of mental states.

Depraved indifference is more than the reck-

lessness required for manslaughter but less than the intentional
killing defined in variation a of the second degree murder
statute.

Standiford, 769 P.2d at 261-64.
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Depraved indifference

is the least common denominator for the first three variants of
second degree murder.

However, any time either of the first two

variations is present, the depraved indifference variation will
also be present, because all three variations evidence at least
depraved indifference.
In this case, the trial judge concluded that the depraved
indifference variation, the variation which Justice Stewart and
the Court concluded must be present when either variations a or b
are present, was absent.

However, that conclusion conflicts with

Russell and Standiford which hold that depraved indifference is
always present when either variation a or b is present.

Thus,

according to Russell and Standiford, when the trial court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to allow the depraved
indifference variation to go to the jury, it also necessarily concluded that neither of the other two variations which require a
greater mens rea than the depraved indifference variation were
also unsupported by the evidence.

When the trial court dismissed

the depraved indifference variation, it should also have dismissed
the other two variations.

Its failure to do so is inconsistent

with the case law of this jurisdiction.

Having concluded that the

evidence did not support the depraved indifference murder, the
trial court simply must have concluded that the evidence was
insufficient to support either of the other two variations which
are "form[s] of depraved indifference murder."
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POINT III
UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, THE TRIAL COURT
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY REFUSING TO
REQUIRE THE JURY TO UNANIMOUSLY DECIDE WHICH
VARIATION OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER
MS. GODDARD COMMITTED.
The defense requested that the trial court submit each of
the remaining two variations of second degree murder to the jury
on individual verdicts.

The defense requested that the jury

return a unanimous verdict as to which variation of second degree
Ms.

Goddard was committed.

(R. 178 at 547)

During closing

arguments, the prosecution argued that some of the jurors could
believe that Ms. Goddard committed one variant of second degree
murder while others could believe she committed the other variant
of second degree murder.

(R. 178 at 526)

In Russell, this Court held that a jury does not have to
be unanimous in deciding which of the three possible mental states
is present in convicting of second degree murder, as long as the
jurors all agreed that at least one of the culpable mental states
is present.

However, Russell contains the caveat that "if the

statute under which the defendant is convicted actually defines
more than one crime, not merely one crime which may be committed
in several different ways, the defendant is entitled to jury unanimity on which crime he is guilty of committing."

7 33 P.2d at

166-67.
If the Court finds that the trial court was correct in
concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support the
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depraved indifference variation but sufficient to support either
variation a or b, then the court should reconsider the jury unanimity issue.

If second degree murder is one crime that may be

committed in three different ways, than insufficiency of the evidence with respect to the "lowest" way should mean that the evidence was insufficient with respect to the other two ways.
e.g. Russell, 733 P.2d at 178 (Durham, J. concurring).

See,

However,

if as the trial court found, sufficient evidence may sustain a
conviction on variation a or b but not on variation c, then the
variations are apparently not closely connected as the court indicated in Russell and the question of jury unanimity on the mental
element should be reevaluated.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT REFUSED TO GRANT MS. GODDARD A NEW
TRIAL BASED ON NEW EVIDENCE.
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
(a) the court may, upon motion of a party or upon
its own initiative, grant a new trial in the
interest of justice if there is any error or
impropriety which had a substantial adverse
effect upon the rights of the parties.
This Court has stated that "newly discovered evidence should clarify a fact that was contested and resolved against the movant, or
be sufficiently persuasive that the result of the trial might be
changed . . . ."

State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 851 (Utah 1988).

In this case the defense moved for a new trial after Ms.
Goddard's sentencing because of newly discovered evidence concern-
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ing blood spattering.

As noted above, Dr. Schnittkerfs testimony

concerning her interpretation of the blood spatters in this case
was crucial to prove the State's theory of the case and to discredit Ms. Goddard's version of the events. After trial, defense
counsel procured the services of Ms. Judith Bunker, a nationally
recognized blood spatter expert.

Ms. Bunker analyzed all of the

evidence in the case as well as Dr. Schnittkerfs testimony.

Dr.

Schnittker had met Ms. Bunker while Dr. Schnittker was attending
a seminar given by Ms. Bunker.

(R. 179 at 8)

Ms. Bunker's report which was presented to the trial
court concluded:
1. [Mr. Hall] was directly above and in contact
with the front of the right armrest when blood
flowed from his wound, prior to falling back onto
the floor.
2. The stains located on the inner armrest near
the backrest indicate the rocker was on its back
when this bloodshed occurred.
3. The location of the rocker stains along with
the final body position strongly suggest the subject was on his knees when the wound was
inflicted. This is also suggested by the presence of flow on subject's left lower pant leg.
4. Ms. Goddard was in the rocker when blood shed
occurred. Her right arm was in front of her when
blood flowed onto the back of her sleeve from
above.
5. She removed herself from the rocker by climbing over the right arm rest, transferring blood
stains and patterns onto the back of her jeans.
6. There is no blood stain evidence to suggest
that blood spurted or otherwise projected from
the wound site at any point following the infliction of the wound.
(R. 155)

(The complete report is included as Addendum D)

only did Ms. Bunker's evidence challenge Dr. Schnittker's
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Not

credibility, it also provided clarification of highly contested
fact at issue in the trial, i.e. whether Mr. Hall was standing
when the fatal wound was inflicted, as the prosecution contended,
or whether he was kneeling, as the defense contended. Ms.
Bunkerfs evidence resolved the issue in favor of the defense.
Furthermore, the evidence was sufficiently persuasive that the
results of the trial might have been changed.

The evidence sup-

ported Ms. Goddard's version of the events.
In responding to the defense argument during the motion
for a new trial, the prosecutor conceded that Ms. Bunker's conclusions could be correct but they did not contradict the State's
evidence during trial.

(R. 181 at 9) For example, the prosecutor

stated that Ms. Bunker's conclusion that Mr. Hall was on his knees
when the wound was inflicted was "not inconsistent with any of the
testimony that Dr. Schnittker gave."

(R. 181 at 9)

However, the

transcript of the trial reveals that Dr. Schnittker employed hypothetical situations during her testimony in which Mr. Hall wasin a
standing position when the wound was inflicted.
312)

(R. 177 at 311,

One may also deduce from Ms. Bunker's conclusion that

because Mr. Hall was directly above the right arm rest of the
rocker and Ms. Goddard was in the rocker when the fatal wound was
inflicted, that Mr. Hall was above Ms. Goddard when the wound was
inflicted.

However, Dr. Schnittker testified in rebuttal that

this could not be the scenario when the wound was inflicted.
Without reviewing the transcripts of the trial, the trial
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court concluded that the evidence presented by Ms. Bunker was not
inconsistent with the trial testimony.

However, comparison of the

trial transcript and Ms. Bunker's evidence clearly indicates that
Ms. Bunker's evidence supports the defense theory of the case and
not the prosecutions.

The evidence presented by the defense clar-

ified a fact that was contested and resolved against Ms. Goddard.
The evidence corroborated Ms. Goddard's story and, considering the
source of the evidence, was probably sufficiently persuasive to
have changed the trial result. A new trial should have been
granted based on the new evidence presented by the defense.
POINT V
MS. GODDARD'S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE
FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS.
Ordinarily, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
are addressed by collateral attack in a habeas corpus proceeding;
however, in some circumstances, the claims may be raised on direct
appeal.

State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Those circumstances appear when the defendant is represented by
new counsel on appeal and the trial record is adequate on the
issues.

Government of the Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125,

133-34 (3d Cir. 1984)

The circumstances are present for this

court to review the ineffectiveness claims raised in this case on
direct appeal.
In cases involving ineffectiveness claims, Utah courts
have adopted the two-part test of Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S.

668, 687 (1984):
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First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This, requires a
showing that that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as "counsel"
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial, a trial whose results are reliable.
See also State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990).

In

short, to demonstrate ineffectiveness, the defendant must demonstrate deficient performance which resulted in prejudice.
In this case, Ms. Goddard contends that her trial counsel
was ineffective because (1) she failed to investigate circumstances surrounding blood spatter evidence until after the trial;
(2) she failed to challenge the medical examiner's qualifications
to testify regarding blood spatter evidence; and (3) she failed to
object to the prosecutor's repeated questions on cross-examination
of the defendant which asked the defendant why other witnesses
would lie.
A. Defense Counsel Was Ineffective Because She Failed to
Investigate Circumstances Surrounding the State's Blood Spatter
Evidence Until After the Trial.
During the course of argument in the hearing on a motion
for a new trial, defense counsel indicated that the blood spatter
testimony offered by the prosecution "came as a surprise to the
defense in this case . . . ."

(R. 181 at 5)

In responding to the

defendant's motion, the prosecutor argued that "this is the kind
of evidence that could have been discovered by the defendant with
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due diligence prior to trial-"

(R. 181 at 11)

The defense had

conducted no investigation regarding blood spatter evidence prior
to the trial in this case.
In State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the defendant alleged that his trial counsel had been ineffective because
he failed to investigate the availability of prospective defense
witnesses.

The defendant had provided counsel with a list of pro-

spective witnesses but counsel did not contact several of the people on the list.

805 P.2d at 187. This Court concluded:

If counsel does not adequately investigate
the underlying facts of the case, including the
availability of prospective defense witnesses,
counsel's performance cannot fall within the
"wide range of reasonable professional
assistance." This is because the decision not to
investigate cannot be considered a tactical
decision. It is only after an adequate inquiry
has been made that counsel can make a reasonable
decision to call or not to call particular witnesses for tactical reasons. Therefore, because
defendant's trial counsel did not make a reasonable investigation into the possibility of procuring prospective defense witnesses, the first
part of the Strickland test has been met.
805 P.2d at 188.
In State v. Crestani, 771 P.2d 1085 (Utah Ct. App. 1989),
the court of appeals held that a defense attorney's failure to
subpoena or even review critical records, his failure to contact
an important witness, and his failure to prepare the defendant and
his wife for their trial testimony constituted prejudicial deficient performance.

771 P.2d at 1090-91. The court stated:

"Certainly, there can be no appropriate performance in the court-
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room without adequate preparation, and without such preparation,
representation is nothing but a sham and a pretense."

771 P.2d at

1092.
Just as in Tempiin and Crestani, in this case counsel
totally failed to undertake an investigation concerning critical
evidence.

Blood spatters were clearly located in the room where

Mr. Hall died and were visible in various photographs that had
been provided to defense counsel during the discovery process.
Furthermore, the assertion that the blood spatter evidence at
trial was a surprise to the defense is belied by the fact that Dr.
Schnittker discussed blood spattering during the preliminary
hearing.

(Addendum E)

Defense counsel should have anticipated

that at trial the prosecution would attempt to explain the blood
spattering in a manner which was inconsistent with Ms. Goddard's
version of the events.3

Counsel's decision not to investigate

simply cannot be considered a tactical decision.

Rather, it is

defective performance which satisfies the first prong of the
Strickland test.
In Tempiin, the Court found that the second prong of the
Strickland test was also met.

The Court determined that the tes-

timony which counsel would have uncovered had he adequately investigated the list of witnesses provided by the defendant would have
reflected on the credibility of the victim in the case by contra-

3

If defense counsel should have undertaken such an investigation
into the blood spatter evidence, then her failure to do so was
defective performance which satisfies the first prong of the
Strickland standard. If, however, the Court determines that
-^fi-

dieting several aspects of the victim's testimony.
188.

805 P.2d at

The court determined that such a contradiction would be

important in the case because the victim's testimony was the only
direct evidence of the defendant's guilt and thus affected the
"entire evidentiary picture."

805 P.2d at 188.

Similarly, in this case, Ms. Bunker's testimony reflected
upon the credibility of Dr. Schnittker and contradicted several
aspects of Schnittker's testimony.

Of all the prosecution

witnesses, only Dr. Schnittker testified that Ms. Goddard's version of the events was "extremely unlikely" and contained "serious
inconsistencies."

Dr. Schnittker alone refuted Ms. Goddard's

testimony and refused to alter her interpretation on crossexamination.4

Therefore, just as in Tempiin, defense counsel's

failure to procure a critical defense witnesses to testify at
trial affected the "entire evidentiary picture" of the trial. Had
Ms.

Bunker testified at the trial, a different outcome, one more

favorable to Ms. Goddard, was likely.
B. Defense Counsel Was Ineffective Because She Failed to
Challenge Dr. Schnittker's Qualifications to Testify Regarding
Blood Spatter Evidence.

defense counsel reasonably could not have foreseen the State's
blood spatter evidence in a manner contrary to that proposed by
Ms. Goddard's version of the event, then the evidence truly must
be considered a surprise as counsel stated during argument in the
hearing on the motion for a new trial. Under that standard, the
"surprise" testimony should have resulted in the trial court's
giving more deference to Ms. Bunker's evidence presented at the
hearing and granting a new trial.
4

The impenetrability of Dr. Schnittker's testimony is clearly demonstrated by defense counsel's remark to Dr. Schnittker after trying to shake Dr. Schnittker's theory of the case. Defense counsel
-T7-

To refute Ms. Goddard's version of the events which
resulted in Mr. Hallfs death, the prosecution called as its first
rebuttal witness Dr. Schnittker.

The prosecutor first related a

hypothetical question which mirrored the events as stated by Ms.
Goddard.

Then the prosecutor asked Dr. Schnittkerfs opinion con-

cerning the likelihood of the events related by the defendant.
During the latter testimony, Dr. Schnittker started offering testimony concerning the blood spatters found on Mr. Hall, Ms.
Goddard, and at the scene.

Defense counsel made no objection to

Dr. Schnittkerfs testimony concerning the blood spatter evidence
even though the prosecutor had not qualified Dr. Schnittker as an
expert in the area of blood spatter evidence.
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.
While the courts of this state have not thoroughly defined the
requirements for an individual to testify as an expert, this Court
has stated that extensive qualifications, either by way of academic training or experience, are necessary in an area of exper-

stated, "Doctor, I give up." (R. 178 at 49 3) Clearly, both Ms.
Goddard and defense counsel would have benefited by Ms. Bunker's
testimony at trial.
--*«-

tise so that an individual may testify as an expert.

See e.g.

State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 37 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493
U.S. 814 (1989); State v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1986).
In interpreting the federal corollary to the Utah rule, one
authority has stated:
An expert must be shown by the party calling
him to possess scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge. Whether the witness is
sufficiently qualified as an expert is a matter
to be decided by the court, . . . . A witness
will be qualified as an expert by reason of
knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education. Under Rule 702, a witness may be
qualified as an expert by virtue of any one such
factor, or upon a culmination of any of the side
factors.
M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence §702.2 at 619-21 (3d Ed.
1991).
After addressing the admissibility of blood spatter
evidence, the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Rodgers, 812 P.2d
1208, 1212 (Idaho 1991), held that blood spatter analysis is a
"well-recognized discipline."

The court held that evidence pre-

sented in that case was admissible because, given the witnesses1
extensive qualifications and experience in the specific field,
"the trial court did not err in finding that there was sufficient
foundation for these witnesses1 testimony and allowing them to
testify."

812 P.2d at 1213.

As a recognized discipline, blood spatter evidence is
amenable to interpretation only by those people who are qualified
in the field.

In this case, defense counsel totally failed to
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challenge Dr. Schnittker's qualification in the field of blood
spatter evidence interpretation.
a tactical decision.

Such a failure simply cannot be

Nothing was to be gained by allowing Dr.

Schnittker's rebuttal testimony.

Counsel's failure to challenge

Dr. Schnittker's qualification to interpret such evidence can only
be termed as deficient performance.
The deficient performance was prejudicial to Ms.
Goddard's case.

Dr. Schnittker's testimony, as amply illustrated

above, was crucial to the prosecutor's repudiation of Ms.
Goddard's testimony.

Critical to Dr. Schnittker's testimony was

her interpretation of the blood spatters at the scene and on the
clothing of both the victim and the defendant.

This testimony was

given despite the fact that Dr. Schnittker apparently had not personally examined the crime scene or the evidence prior to trial.
(R. 142)

(Addendum F)

Had she not been allowed to testify as an

expert in the area of blood spatter evidence, Dr. Schnittker would
have been unable to provide what she considered to be the most
compelling flaw in the defendant's testimony, i.e. that the shirt
which the defendant was wearing did not have any blood spatters on
the front of it.

If Dr. Schnittker's blood spatter testimony is

subtracted from the evidence, the entire evidentiary picture is
changed.

No compelling reasons for disbelieving the defendant are

offered by the prosecution.

Therefore, there is a reasonable

likelihood that the outcome would have been different.
C. Ms. Goddard's Trial Counsel Was Ineffective Because She Failed
to Object to the Prosecution's Repeated Questions of the Defendant
Asking Why Other Witnesses Would Lie.

./n_

At several points during the prosecutor's crossexamination of Ms. Goddard, the prosecutor asked Ms. Goddard why
other witnesses would lie.

(R. 178 at 447, 448, 449)

In response

to each of these questions, Ms. Goddard could offer no explanation
why another witness would lie during his or her testimony.

These

questions drew no objection from defense counsel.
In State v. Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 36 (Utah
1992), this Court addressed the issue of a prosecutor's questions
to a defendant concerning the defendant's implied claims that
another witness was lying.

The Court stated:

Several courts have noted that it is improper to
ask a criminal defendant to comment on the veracity of another witness. The question is improper
because it is argumentative and seeks information
beyond the witness's competence. The prejudicial
effect of such a question lies in the fact that
it suggests to the jury that a witness is committing perjury even though there are other explanations for the inconsistencies. In addition, it
puts the defendant in the untenable position of
commenting on the character and motivations of
another witness who may appear sympathetic to the
jury. This question, therefore, was also
improper.
It is not necessary to address how these
questions affected the trial, given our previous
holdings. However, we feel again compelled to
note that prosecutors have a duty to eschew all
improper tactics.
184 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36 (footnotes and citations omitted).

Given

the magnitude of the error and the "untenable position" which such
question puts the defendant in, defense counsel's failure to
object to such questioning cannot be a tactical decision.
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Defense

counsel simply cannot make the choice to make the defendant appear
less sympathetic to the jury by having to explain why another witness would lie. A failure to object to such questioning is deficient performance.
When the chilling effect of the questions propounded by
the prosecutor is taken in concert with the other deficiencies of
defense counsel in failing to exclude or explain Dr. Schnittker's
testimony, the entire evidentiary picture of the trial is
effected.

Indeed, the questions propounded by the prosecutor

question the veracity of testimony offered by Christine Grogan,
Frank Gutierrez and Beth Steed.

These witnesses arguably provided

evidence which indicated Ms. Goddardfs mental state prior to the
homicide.

By diminishing Ms. Goddard's credibility with the jury

while at the same time bolstering the credibility of the other
three witnesses, the prosecutor promoted his claim that the homicide was an intentional act by Ms. Goddard.

Had defense counsel

interposed a timely objection, Ms. Goddard's credibility would not
have been diminished in the eyes of the jury.
CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Defendant Teri
Goddard respectfully requests that this Court reverse her conviction and remand for a new trial or dismissal of the charge.
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Respectfully submitted this
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Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, this
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ADDENDUM A

DAVID E. YOCOM
County Attorney
RODWICKE YBARRA, Bar No. 4184
Deputy County Attorney
Courtside Office Building
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: (801) 363-7900

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Screened by: R. Ybarra
Assigned to: Special Victim

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

BAIL

$50,000.00

v.
INFORMATION
TERI LIN GODDARD

4/17/54,
Criminal No.

Defendant(s).

901 ^ 2 # ? FS

The undersigned Detective J. Mendez - SLCPD under oath
states on information and belief that the defendant(s) committed the
crimes of:
COUNT I
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, a First Degree
Felony, at 1235 LaFayette Drive, in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, on or about June 2, 1990, in violation of
Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203, Utah Code Annotated
V\t>\
X
1953, as amended, in that the defendant, TERI LIN
^
y
-\)A
GODDARD, a party to the offense, intentionally or
ii^ %T \
knowingly caused the death of Derek Hall, and/or
gs*F
intending to cause serious bodily injury to another,
v, v\
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that
.«^ v
caused the death of Derek Hall, and/or acting under
p
circumstances evidencing depraved indifference to human
life, engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of
death to another, and thereby caused the death of Derek
Hall;

(Continued on page 2)
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INFORMATION
STATE v. TERI LIN GODDARD
County Attorney #90 1 80709/01
Page 2
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
Officers:
Others:

R. Hawke, R. Linton, S. Cheever, W. Poulsen, J. Candland,
J. Campbell, C. Oliver and J. Mendez.
Jay Jackson, Sharon Schnittker, Brent Marchant, Pillar
Shortsleeve, Brenda Christensen, Louise Miyetake, Beth
Steed, Tom Flolks, Dick Droubay and Christine Grogan.

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiant, a Salt Lake City Police Detective, bases this
Information on their reports, Case No. 90-052813, which he has read,
and his personal investigation which disclosed the following:
1. The report of Officer R. Linton of the Salt Lake City
Police Department to the effect that on June 2, 1990, upon responding
to a dispatch of a fight entered the residence at 1235 Lafayette
Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, upon the insistence of the defendant and
discovered the body of a deceased male adult.
2. The report of Officer Sterling
City Police Department to the effect that
location and date he observed the defendant
the house with a fishing knife lying next
later taken into evidence and is a fishing
inch blade.

Hamner of the Salt Lake
at the above-mentioned
setting on the porch of
to her. The knife was
filet knife with a four

3. The report of Officer Robert D. Hawke of the Salt Lake
City Police Department to the effect that the above-described
deceased individual had a single puncture wound to the center of his
chest. Officer Hawke was able to identify the deceased by his Utah
State Driver's License as Derek G. Hall.
4. An Autopsy performed by Dr. Sharon Schnittker, Utah
State Medical Examiner, on the deceased disclosed that the cause of
death was a single puncture wound to the aorta.
Dr. Schnittker
opines that due to the nature of the wound, the stabbing was non
accidental. No other signs of wounds or trauma were found on the
body.

(Continued on page 3)
/^^rltA,.
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INFORMATION
STATE v. TERI LIN GODDARD
County Attorney #90 1 80709/01
Page 3
5. A review of the Salt Lake City Dispatch tape concerning
the above-described incident discloses the defendant's statement, "I
stabbed himi I think he's dead!"
6. The oral statement of Ms. Christine Grogan to the Salt
Lake City Police Department complaint taker to the effect that the
defendant had been running up and down the street screaming, "I
killed him! I killed him!"
7. Your affiant responded to the scene of the homicide
which disclosed no evidence of a fight or struggle other than one
chair which appeared to have been overturned as the victim fell.

Authorized for presentment and
filing:

^S/TCW

DAVID E. YOCOM, County Attorney
., Deputy
June 7, 199a
lls/3971
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ADDENDUM B

,CT!7

BROOKE C. WELLS (3421)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

b 5Qft"*9Q
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

:
:

vs.

:

TERI LIN GODDARD,

:

Defendant.

MOTION IN ARREST
OF JUDGMENT

Case No. 901901103FS
JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG

:

COMES NOW the Defendant, TERI LIN GODDARD, by and
through counsel of record and moves this Court for an Order
pursuant to Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
arresting the judgment rendered against the Defendant on
October 11, 1990 by an eight-member jury.

The Defendant bases

this Motion on the grounds that the facts proved do not
constitute the offense of Second Degree Homicide, that the
testimony on which the State based its case was in major part
based upon the incredible opinion testimony of the Assistant
Medical Examiner, and that the interests of justice are not

001

best served by entering judgment against the Defendant for
Second Degree Homicide.
SUBMITTED this

/

l&

day of October, 1990.

BROOKE C. WELLS
Attorney for Defendant

NOTICE OF HEARING
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
You and each of you please take notice that the
above-entitled matter will come on regularly for hearing on
the

/ ^ ^ d a y otQ//i^Q/^j

. 1990 at the hour of

j?S3aa~m.

before the Honorable David S. Young, Third District Court Judge.
Please govern yourselves accordingly.
DATED this /*

day of October/ 1990.

MAI LED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Motion to
Rodwicke Ybarra, Deputy County Attorney, Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 this /fj

day of October, 1990.
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Thire Judicial District

BROOKE C. WELLS (3421)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

DEC

7 1990
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE
OF SENTENCING DATE,
RENEWED MOTION FOR ARREST
OF JUDGMENT OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TERI LIN GODDARD,

Case No. 901901103FS
JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG

Defendant.

COMES NOW the defendant, TERI LIN GODDARD, by and
through her counsel of record, BROOKE C. WELLS, and moves this
Court to continue the date of defendant's scheduled sentencing,
arrest the judgment of conviction rendered against the
defendant for the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the
Second Degree, a first degree felony, or in the alternative
order a new trial.

Defendant's motions are made pursuant to

Rules 23 and 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and are
hereby filed prior to the imposition of sentence presently
scheduled for December 7, 1990.
Defendant's motions are made based upon defendant's
recent discovery of potential exculpatory forensic evidence not
previously available to defendant which is expected to

GOiS-d

contradict the findings of Dr. Sharon Schnittker, the State's
key trial witness/ that defendant's theory that the death of
Derek Hall could not have occurred accidentally.

However, as

allowed by Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
defendant needs additional time to secure supporting affidavits
from Dr. Judith Bunker, forensic expert in the area of blood
analysis, after she conducts further forensic testing in her
laboratory located in Orlando, Florida and needs approximately
30 days to complete testing and prepare a report with
supporting affidavit.

Additionally, based upon the written

findings of Dr. Bunker, the defense expects to present her
findings to others involved in the investigation and trial of
defendant.

Their affidavits may also be submitted to the Court

in support of defendant's motion.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant respectfully
requests that the Court continue defendant's sentencing and set
an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motions after review of
defendant's affidavits which the defendant expects to provide
to the Court on or before January 31, 1991, after which a
hearing date could be scheduled.
DATED this

/ day of DecemBSlr, 1990.

UMb

BROOKE C. WELLS
Attorney for Defendant
- 2 -

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to Rodwicke
Ybarra, Deputy County Attorney, 231 East Fourth South, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111 this

/

day ©f>pecember, 1990.
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BROOKS C. WELLS (3421)
Attorney fox Defendant
SAL? LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East SOO South, Suite 300
salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Telephone: 532-5444
HI TEE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COOMTY, STATE OF UTAH
TBS STATS OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT IK SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR A NEW TRIAL

vs.
TERI LYKK GODDARD,
Defendant.

Case No. 901901103FS
JUDGE DAVID S. XOUNO

I, JUDITH L. &UKKER, affiant herein do hereby
acknowledge and certify as follows:
1. X have expertise and training in th* area of
Forensic case Analysis, including analysis of blood spatter
evidence,

(A copy of ay Curriculum Vita is attached and by

reference aade a part hereof).
2*

I was retained by the Salt Lake Legal Defender

Association to analyse and review blood spatter evidence
presented by the State of Utah against the defendant in the
ease of State v. Terl Lvnn aaAa***.

APR 24 'SI lit 18

SSI 364 0913 PAGE.082

00150

APR-24-1991 18U7 FROM

KHUD'S S.L.C. 1

TO

13B32785S52

P.03

3. I have personally examined autopsy reports,
photographs, clothing, a svivel rocker, police reports, the
trial testimony of Teri Lynn ooddard and Dr. Sharon sehnittXer,
Assistant Utah Xedical Examiner, as veil as the entirety of the
trial transcript including arguments of both counsel for the
State and the defense setting forth their respective theories.
4«

Based on the evidence provided, X conclude that

the blood spatter evidence is consistent with the trial
testimony and explanation of Teri Lynn Goddard and inconsistent
with the theory argued by the State's attorney and the trial
testimony of Dr. Sharon Schnittkor»
5- A copy of my report is attached hereto and by
reference made a part hereof,
DATED this W

day of April, 1991.

forensic consultant
STATE 07 FLORIDA

)

County of Uti^MSr^hu)
On the S?¥

day of April, 1991, personally appeared

before me, JODITE L. BUNK8B. the signer of the foregoing
lnstrtttient, who duly acknowledged to no that she executed the

'fa LM&
-/O

NOTARY PUBETD' Vt^tf

Residing inP., JZfePJk*^

My Caagission Expires:

APR H4

f

9l

11M8
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J.L. BUNKER & ASSOCIATES
A N A F F I L I A T I O N OF FORENSIC C O N S U L T A N T S
POST OFFICE BOX 551 • O R L A N D O . FLORIDA 32802
( 4 0 7 ) 880-8149

REPORT OF ANALYSIS
TO:

•
•
•
•

RECONSTRUCTION
EXPERT TESTIMONY
INTERROGATORIES
TRIAL EXHIBITS

I N S T R U C T I O N A L PROGRAMS
• LECTURES
• WORKSHOPS

Brooke Wells# Trial Counsel
Salt lake Legal Defender Association

FROM:
Judith L. Bunker, Forensic Consultant
DATE:
REFERENCE:

April 14, 1991
State v Teri Goddard
Case No. 901901103FS

SUBJECT:

Derek Hall, Deceased 6/2/90

CIRCUMSTANCES:

Subject found dead from stab wound of
chest. Study photographs and other
evidence to establish position(s) of
persons and objects during and following
bloodshed.

EVIDENCE
EXAMINED:

Original and Supplementary Police
Reports, Salt Lake City Police Dept.
Autopsy Protocol - Dr. Schnittker
10 color photographs, scene & morgue
Trial testimony - Dr. Schnittker
Remainder of trial transcript
Evidence as follows:
Exhibit 27-S - Sweatshirt
28-S - Bluejearns
29-S - Bluejeans
16-S - Swivel Rocker

NOTE: Case file was submitted to this office by Investigator
Dennis Couch on November 26, 1990. The clothing and chair
were examined at the Salt Lake City Courthouse on December 4,
1991. The complete trial transcript was submitted to this
Office on March 28, 1991.
CASE SUMMARY:
Subject, Derrick Hall, was found dead on the living room
floor of his residence on June 2, 1990, having suffered a
stab wound to the chest. This incident occurred following an
altercation between the subject and his roommate, Teri Lin
Goddard.

G0:
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AUTOPSY:
Cause of death is a single stab wound to the chest. The
wound track is front to back and horizontal and slightly
right to left. This wound penetrated the anterior ascending
aorta, producing a cardiac tamponade. A significant finding
was a superficial cut at the base of the left second finger.
Toxicology studies revealed a blood alcohol level of 0.16 mg%
PHOTOGRAPHS:
The photographs describe bloodshed confined to the overturned
rocker and the body. The rocker is seen lying on its back.
It was reportedly repositioned by rescue personnel.
Subsequent photographs of the upright chair describe
bloodstaining of the right armrest. (See examination) The
body is lying supine with both knees bent toward the torso.
There is blood flow upward from the wound, associated with
the subject's descent to the floor. There is smearing or
smudging of blood around the wound site. The hands appear to
be free of bloodstaining.
CLOTHING:
27-S Sweatshirt!

This is a melon colored sweatshirt,
Tultex brand, size small, 50% cotton 50%
acrylic. Blood stains are confined to
the back of the right sleeve. The oval
to elliptical appearing stains are
directed laterally and downward. They
range in size from 6 mm to 10 mm in
diameter representing blood flow from
above. Two larger stains measuring
approximately 20 mm have been smeared
while wet.

28-S Bluejeans:

These blue jeans, size 34, were removed
from Teri Goddard. There are two oval
appearing stains on right lower leg, loll11 above the hemline, measuring 5mm to
6mm in diameter. Otherwise, the front of
the jeans are free of staining.

STATE V GODDARD
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The back of the jeans contain transfer
patterns. There are elliptical and
linear stains on the right hip which
correspond to stains seen on the rocker
arm. There are elliptical and linear
stains seen on the left hip which also
correspond to the stained rocker arm.
The right lower leg contains circular to
oval appearing transfer stains associated
with smudging which also correspond to
the stains seen on the rocker arm.
29-S Bluejeans:

These bluejeans were removed from the
body. There are no labels. A total of 9
stains are observed on the front of
the left lower leg 12 - 15w above the
hem. One stain measures 20 mm. with the
remainder ranging in size from 3 - 7 mm.
These stains were not visible in the
photographs. These stains represent
blood dropped from above.

16-S Chair:

This gold colored stuffed swivel rocker
measures 17" from floor to cushion, 6"
from cushion to top of arm rest, 28" from
cushion to top of backrest and is 28"
wide.
The front of the right arm rest is
stained by blood flow from above and
liquid blood in direct contact with the
fabric. These stains are associated with
smudging or swiping while the blood is
still wet. The liquid blood transfer
continues across the inner arm, breaking
into droplets toward the backrest
describing a cast-off pattern from front
to back, laterally. The inner fabric of
the cushion below the armrest is also
stained.

NOTE: Color photographic slides were taken to document
bloodstain evidence on clothing and rocker.
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CONCLUSIONS:
The following conclusions are based solely
upon the evidence provided. There is no report that serology
studies were conducted on any of these items. Considering
that this incident involved only one blood source, the
following conclusions and observations are submitted:
1.

Subject was directly above and in contact with the front
of the right armrest when blood flowed from his wound,
prior to falling back onto the floor.

2.

The stains located on the inner armrest near the
backrest indicate the rocker was on its back when this
bloodshed occurred.

3.

The location of the rocker stains along with the final
body position strongly suggest the subject was on his
knees when the wound was inflicted. This is also
suggested by the presence of flow on subject's left
lower pant leg.

4.

Ms. Goddard was in the rccker when bloodshed occurred.
Her right arm wac in front of her when blood flowed onto
the back of her sleeve from above.

5.

She removed herself from the rocker by climbing over the
right armrest, transferring blood stains and patterns
onto the back of her jearns.

6.

There is no bloodstain evidence to suggest that blood
spurted or otherwise projected from the wound site at
any point following the infliction of the wound.

Respectfully submitted,

Judith L. Bunker
Forensic Consultant
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Q

And have you had particular —

any particular

training with regard to blood coagulation and congealing and
that sort of thing?
A

Yes.

Q

Let me now show you what's been marked as State's

Exhibits 8 and 9 for identification and ask you —

you don't

personally recognize these photographs, do you?
A

No, I don't.

Q

I ask you to consider hypothetically —

first ask you, do you observe on the —

well, let me

what appears to be the

arm of a.^air snmp hrnMnf reddish-brown stains?
A

Yes.

0

Let me ask you to consider that if* those stains were

hypothetically blood, and do you get a feeling from what you
observe as to the amount of blood thatmjjtil" h? *"hprff?
A
to make —

Well, depends on how deeply it saturates.

It's hard

it's not very much blood, You know, I'd say a small

amount of blood in this particular occasion.

It looks very

superficial and not a large amount of blood.
Q

If that were, in fact, blood that was deposited on

the arm of that chair, how —

do you have an opinion as to how

long that would remain liquid enough for it to continue to
run?

Do you understand my question?

I don't know if I've

exactly expressed it well.
MS. WELLS:

jnriV

I would object without further
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1

foundation.

2

MR. YBARRA:

I don't know what further foundation

3

she wants for expertise.

4

stipulation in this regard.

5

MS. WELLS:

And I believe we have some

It's not a matter of her expertise, it's

6

a matter of what information we have concerning the

7

coagulation of blood, the amounts, all of those type of

8

variables that would have to come into play before she could

9

make any kind of a conclusion.

10

MR. YBARRA:

11

has an opinion.

12

question.

13

in this regard.

Well, I first want to find out if she

If she doesn't, I won't even ask the

I think I can ask whether or not she has an opinion

14

THE COURT:

15

liquid state so it would run?

16

MR. YBARRA:

17

THE COURT:

18

As to how long it would continue in a

Such that it could run, yes.
She may answer that question, she has

the expertise.

19

THE WITNESS:

Well, I think that it sort of depends

20

upon the material and, again, the amount of blood and so

21

forth.

22

certainly would not be a very long time, because it's a thick

23

material and it looks like a fairly thin layer of blood, so it

24

really would —

25

would be hard for my to say.

It would be —

it would be hard for me to say.

It

it would depend on this type of material.
It would not be a very long

n^nTmnT
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period of time because it was absorbed by the material
immediately.

And really not —

it's not like a smooth surface

where the blood will continued to run, it has to seep through
a rather thick looking material.
0

(BY MR. YBARRA)

So to be more specific and give an

approximate time frame, you would need more specific
information about the material and the quantity of blood?
A

I think one would have to experiment with that

material and with a certain amount of blood similar to the
patient's blood.
Q

I really wouldn't have any idea.

But preliminarily you would think it would be a

short period of time?
MS. WELLS:

Objection, she's answered and he's

restating for her what her opinoin might have been.
THE COURT: Yes, the last statement by Counsel may
be stricken out.
MR. YBARRA:

Thank you.

No further questions.

Pass

the witness.
THE COURT:

You may cross.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MS. WELLS:
Q

Dr. Schnittker, you're not making any conclusion

today about whether or not this wound was intentionally
inflicted or not; is that right?
A

Based on the information that I had and the autopsy
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I, DENNIS R. COUCH, affiant herein do hereby
acknowledge and certify as follows:
1.

I am an investigator with the Salt Lake Legal

Defender Association.
2.

Prior to becoming employed with the Salt Lake

Legal Defender Association, I was a deputy with the Salt Lake
County Sheriff's Office having been a detective in the Homicide
Division from 1975 to 1990 where I was involved in the
investigation of approximately 200 homicides.
3.

I have attended numerous homicide investigations

and forensic evidence seminars during my employment as a
homicide detective.
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4.

In my capacity as an Investigator with the Salt

Lake Legal Defender Association I was assigned to assist Brooke
C. Wells, attorney for Teri Lin Goddard, Defendant in the
above-referenced case.
5.

Prior to the beginning of Defendant's trial on

October 9, 1990, I reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript
on the above-referenced case, all police reports and
interviewed witnesses.

The transcripts and reports indicated

the State's theory was that while in a standing position Derek
Hall, the deceased, was stabbed in the chest by the Defendant
during a domestic altercation and that he then fell knocking
over a chair on which he left blood spots dripping in the
direction the chair was overturned.
6.

All pre-trial discovery and investigation

indicated that the State had conducted no forensic examination
or tests.
7.

I participated in Defendant's trial by assisting

Ms. Wells at counsel table.
8.

Based upon pre-trial interviews with the State and

observations of the chair and the Defendant's clothing I
concluded, based upon my experience, that the State's theory
was incorrect and that the physical evidence was consistent
with Defendant's statement that the death of Derek Hall was
accidental and occurred while the Defendant, who was wielding a
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knife, was forced by Hall into a near prone position on her
back in the questioned chair, while her hands were held against
her body by Hall and that Hall fell forward onto the knife and
onto the arm of the chair from a kneeling position between her
legs after which she pushed him back and got out of the chair,
probably tipping it over.
9.

At Defendant's trial, Defendant testified and

demonstrated to the Court and jury how Hall's death occurred in
a manner consistent with her previous statements to me.
10.

The State called as a rebuttal expert witness,

Dr. Sharon Schnittker, who testified without benefit of any
pre-trial personal or forensic examination of the crime scene,
the chair or clothes in question, that Defendant's testimony
could not be true since blood could be expected to appear on
the front of Defendant's sweatshirt (rather than on the sleeve
where it did appear).
11.

To my knowledge there is no recognized expert in

the area of blood spatter analysis within the State of Utah.
12.

Such rebuttal testimony came as a surprise to the

defense as it was not based on any scientific review or
examination of blood spatter or reports containing such
information nor was Dr. Schnittker a recognized expert in the
area.
13.

As a result of the verdict of guilty returned by

the jury against Ms. Goddard, I contacted several jurors and
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conducted interviews.

The jurors indicated they relied upon

the opinion of Dr. Schnittker, as an expert, that Defendants
testimony was untruthful based primarily on the lack of blood
on Defendant's sweatshirt.
14.

Based upon this information I located a

nationally recognized blood spatter expert, Dr. Judith Bunker
of Bunker and Associates of Orlando, Florida, concerning the
blood spatter evidence of this case and the opinions rendered
by Dr. Schnittker, a medical doctor, upon which the jury
relied.
15.

On December 4, 1990, Dr. Bunker visited Salt Lake

City to conduct a blood spatter seminar, attended by local
police as well as Dr. Schnittker, and examined the questioned
chair and clothing.

She spent several hours photographing the

items and conducting preliminary experiments to determine the
validity of Dr. Schnittker's opinion and Defendant's
explanation.
16.

Dr. Bunker's preliminary findings as explained to

me are that the blood spatter evidence is consistent with an
accidental killing as testified to by Defendant and
inconsistent with the testimony and opinion of Dr. Sharon
Schnittker.
17.

Dr. Bunker indicated a need to conduct scientific

analysis only possible in a laboratory setting.

- 4 -

18.

Due to her prescheduled trial and work

commitments, Dr. Bunker does not expect to be able to provide a
preliminary report to the defendant prior to January 30, 1991,
19.

Dr. Bunker's report and affidavit will be

submitted as soon as received by the defense.
DATED this ZZ

day of January, 1991.
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DENNIS R. COUCH
Investigator
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
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of January, 1991, personally appeared

before me, DENNIS R. COUCH# the signer of the foregoing
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.
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